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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JAMES G. CLAWSON and JOAN M.
CLAWSON, his wife; TEX R. OLSEN
and MONNA LEE OLSEN, his wife;
and KEN CHAMBERLAIN and JEANNINE
W. CHAMBERLAIN, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

-vsNO. 13653
BRUCE L. MOESSER and RUTH ANNE
MOESSER, husband and wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

PETITION
Come now the Respondents, James G. Clawson and Joan M. Clawson, his wife; Tex R. Olsen and Monna Lee Olsen, his wife; and
Ken Chamberlain and Jeannine W. Chamberlain, his wife, and petition the Court for a rehearing in the captioned case upon the
following grounds and for the following reasons:
1. The majority opinion of May 2, 1975 has, without treating
the subject, inadvertently overruled a long standing principle
of real property of this state, to-wit:

the landowner's title

and right to possession, use, and benefit of property sold on
mortgage foreclosure or execution sale is reserved to him during the redemption period and until the sheriff's deed.

Local Realty vs. Linquist, 96 Utah 293, 85 P2d 770 (1938)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-22. The majority opinion has decided the case on an issue
and a theory not raised in the lower court or considered in
any brief or oral argument; therefore, Respondents have never
had the opportunity or occasion to present the rule of law
reflected in this Petition and Brief which rule, the undersigned submits, has been well settled and of long standing.
3. The majority opinion has incorrectly applied those cases
from other jurisdictions upon which its result is based.
4. In addition to reversing, unintentionally, the rule respecting right to possession during the redemption period, the
majority opinion, if unmodified, will establish an undesirable
and conflicting legal precedent, to-wit:
An owner of land may mortgage his property to one person
and convey to another, then default on his mortgage, allow a
sale, and thereafter redeem from that sale and thereby defeat
the title of his own grantee.
Such a defaulting mortgagor could avoid legal obligations
of a like kind to the injury of holders of lawful claims by
execution, inferior judgments, voluntarily and involuntarily
created liens, and similar interests in the title.
Cases cited in the annexed Brief have, by express holdings,
appropriately prohibited that result.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3WHEREFORE, Respondents respectfully request a rehearing
and the opportunity to present those cases and treat those
issues raised for the first time by the theory upon which
the majority opinion is based.
Respectfully submitted,

Ken Chamberlain
01sen and Chamberlain
76 South Main Street
Richfield, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiffs
and Respondents
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JAMES G. CLAWSON and JOAN M.
CLAWSON, his wife; TEX R. OLSEN
and MONNA LEE OLSEN, his wife;
and KEN CHAMBERLAIN and JEANNINE W. CHAMBERLAIN, his wife,
NO. 13653
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
-vsBRUCE L. MOESSER and RUTH ANNE
MOESSER, husband and wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
POINT

I

THE MAJORITY OPINION, WITHOUT BEING REVISED,
WILL INADVERTENTLY REPEAL A RULE OF LONG
STANDING IN THIS STATE: THAT UNDER A MORTGAGE
FORECLOSURE OR EXECUTION SALE, TITLE AND THE
RIGHT TO POSSESSION, USE AND BENEFIT OF THE
PROPERTY WILL NOT l PASS UNTIL THE SHERIFF'S
DEED IS EXECUTED
Both Mr. Justice Ellett for the majority and Mr. Justice
Crockett in his dissent have correctly resolved and applied
four of the rules fundamental to mortgage foreclosure and
execution sales. Without arguing them we restate them herewith:
(1) Sale thereunder entirely exhausts the lien of a mortgage; (2) Any deficiency judgment attaches only after the sale
proceeds have been credited against the amount due; (3) The
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
contain errors.
Local Realty vs.Machine-generated
Lindquist,OCR,
96 may
Utah
297. 85 P2d 770 (1938)

-2lien can attach only to the property in the name of the mortgagor (judgment debtor) as of the date of the deficiency judgment achieves the dignity of a lien;and (4) The judgment
debtor has the absolute right, by statute, to redeem.
But in order to reach the further result - amounting to
the disposition of this case - that SpauldingTs redemption
took title back to himself, the majority opinion makes this
ruling, although incorrect, which is essential to the ultimate
holding:
* * * When Spaulding redeemed * * * he gave no
vitality to Clawsons' defunct
claim.
If Clawsons1 claim (which was the legal title to the land)
were defunct at the time of SpauldingTs redemption
not dispute the Justices1 statement.

we could

But to characterize Claw-

sons' claim as defunct would unintentionally obliterate a
fundamental right which has been established for many years
in this state:

The right to possession, use, and the rents

and profits of the mortgaged estate during the period of redemption.
The case of Local

770 (1938)

Realty

vs.

Lindquist3

96 Utah

2973

85 P2d

is a landmark decision in which the present Chief

Justice was prevailing counsel.
The issue in that case was the entitlement to the value of
use and possession of the mortgaged premises during the redemption period.

The Lindquist case holds:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-3* * * title does not pass to the purchaser until
execution and delivery of the [sheriff's] deed
and such is the recognized rule now in practically all states. If the legal title had already
passed there would be no necessity for a conveyance [85 P2d at

773]

This holding is not dicta

but is essential to the result,

otherwise, how could the mortgagor have been awarded the
usufruct of the land during the redemption period.
Going back one step in the chain of title to this property,
the redemption period incident to the sale at which Clawson
purchased Spauldingfs interest had expired and Clawson
obtained his sheriff's deed on October 16, 1969, many months
before Spaulding redeemed.
Under Rule 69(e)(6) Clawson took all right, title, interest,
and claim which Spaulding had in the property.
The cases cited in the majority opinion correctly hold
that a mortgagor has a right to redeem but not because he has
a claim in or title to the land or in fact any interest in
the land but because the statute says he has that right. All
those cases reflect situations where the mortgagor or debtor
had parted with all his title; otherwise th^rwouM never have
arisen or needed deciding.

Also, those cases say there may

be a variety of reasons why a mortgagor or debtor should be
able to redeem.
But none of those cases says that the redemption takes
title back to the mortgagor or debtor.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4It now becomes important to see what the Utah cases say
about the question.

In order to reach the result in Local

Realty

the Court said:

vs.

Lindquist

[85 P2d at 772] A redemption is not
or a
re-purchase.

a

re-sale

* * * xt is generally consummated without the knowledge of the purchaser at the time, and without
his consent and perhaps often as against his will.
The money is generally paid to the sheriff who
voids or annuls as it were the sale and cancels
the certificate.
*

*

*

In a very general way and speaking loosely, the
interest of the purchaser on execution sale and during the redemption period may be called a lien, as it
signifies an interest in the property which may be
cancelled, lost or voided upon payment of a certain
sum of money. * * * The purchaser has bought the land
from the sheriff and paid for it, upon a sale, which
may be voided or in effect rejected by the debtor by
the simple expedient of him repaying to the purchaser
the amount paid with interest within a limited time.
* *

*

In such sale the purchaser is not subrogated to and
does not acquire all the right, title, estate,
interest or claim of the judgment debtor until the
expiration of the redemption period.
The holding of the Lindquist

case to the effect that the judg

ment debtor is, in contemplation of law, the owner of property
sold under execution during the redemption period and has the
right to its use and occupation was not given consideration
in the majority opinion when it characterizes Clawson1s claim
as defunct

by the statement:

[Redemption] gave no vitality to Clawson1s
claim.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

defunct

-5The holding that a redemption is not a re-sale or a
re-purchase is likewise essential to the holding that the
use, possession, and entitlement to benefits of the land
during the redemption do not pass to the purchaser until
the sheriff's deed because if tte redemption did start a new
title the necessary implication would be that the holder of
the certificate of sale had the title and the benefits that
flow from it all the time.
at 85 P2d p.

The Lindquist

case says as much

773:

* * * if the legal title had already passed,
there would be no necessity for a conveyance
(citing cases).
And Local

Realty

vs.

Lindquist

It drew upon Carlquist

regarded.

248 P 481 (1926)

is not a case lightly
vs.

Colthovp

> 67 Utah

514 5

which became the subject of an annotation in

47 ALR 1st Series (p. 765) for the proposition that even the
appointment of a receiver does not transfer the benefits of
possession during the redemption period to the execution sale
purchaser.
Local

Realty

vs.

Lindquist

was cited in this Court's

unanimous decision by then District Judge Ellett in Lay ton
Layton,

105 Utah

l3

140 P2d 759

(1943)

vs.

for its holding that:

In a very general way and speaking loosely,
the interest of a purchaser on execution sale
and during redemption period may be called a
lien as it signifies an interest in the property

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-6which may be cancelled, lost, or voided upon payment of a certain sum of money * * * It is a right
which may be defeated by payment of such sum. The
purchaser has bought the land from the sheriff and
paid for it, upon a sale, which may be voided or
in effect rejected by the debtor by the simple
expedient of him repaying to the purchaser the
amount paid with interest within a limited time.
That a redemption is not a re-sale or re-purchase (85 P2d at
7 72) is galvanized by the unqualified statement in Volume 55
Am.Jur2d, p.781, Mortgages,§ 901.
Effect of Redemption:
* * * it [redemption] does not give to the mortgagor a new title, however, but merely restores
to him the title freed of the encumbrance of the
lien foreclosed [Emphasis added]
In Volume 59, CJS, p.1705, Mortgages, § 875(e) the universal
rule is stated:
-k * * redemption by the mortgagor or his grantee
does

not

give

him a new title,

but merely restores

him to his former title of ownership of the property free of the encumbrance.
The majority opinion, in the face of that universally-accepted
rule, has given Spaulding an entirely new title because he
(Spaulding) parted with all right, title, interest, and claim
to the property on October 16, 1969 under a valid sheriff's
deed and almost nine months before he redeemed from the second
sale.

To give Spaulding anything on that second redemption is

to create an entirely new, separate and distinct title unrelated
to the old one.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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II

REDEMPTION BY ONE WHO HAS PARTED WITH TITLE
SUSTAINS TITLE WHERE IT IS THEN VESTED - NOT
BACK TO THE MORTGAGOR WHO HAS CONVEYED
The majority opinion is correct in that (1) A sale thereunder exhausts the lien of a mortgage; (2) A deficiency judgment attaches only after the sale proceeds have been credited
2
against the amount due; and (3) The lien can attach only to
property in the name of the mortgagor (judgment debtor) as of
the date the deficiency judgment achieves the dignity and effect
of a lien^ and (4) that the judgment debtor (mortgagor) had
the absolute right to redeem.
Although, however, the three cases cited in the majority
opinion do clearly hold, as that opinion recites, that a mortgagor having parted with his title may nevertheless redeem,
those cases do not hold that such redemption gives the title
back to the mortgagor who has conveyed.
Most notable is the Iowa case of Harvey vs.
16 Iowa

3973

85 Am.Dec.

526

(1864)

Spaulding3

which was an action or a

proceeding where the foreclosing mortgagor and Plaintiff advanced the contention that a judgment debtor had no right to
redeem from the sheriff's sale because he had, before the sale,
2

7 8-37-2 Utah Code Annotated, 1953. First National Bank of Salt
Lake City vs. Hammond, 89 Utah 151, 59 P2d 1401.

3
4

Ulrich vs. Lincoln Realty Co., 197 P2d 149, 180 Ore 380; Barry vs,
Harnesberger (CCA 7th) 148 F.346.
Rule 69(f)(1) U.R.C.P.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8parted with all of his interest in the land and that at the
time he sought to redeem he had no interest whatever in the
real estate.

The Supreme Court of Iowa stated:

The question gives us no trouble. The statute
expressly provides that the judgment debtor may
redeem.
The effect of Harvey

vs.

Spaulding

was to validate the

mortgagor's redemption and to establish title in the redeeming
mortgagor's grantee.
Likewise in Yoakum vs.

Bower3

51 Cat.

539 (1876)

are almost exactly identical to those here.

the facts

Margaret J. Bur-

dete sold property subject to a pending action in December
1874.

In April 1875 the Plaintiff in that action recovered a

judgment and an order of execution which was delivered to the
sheriff (Bower) and Defendant in the action.

Even though she

had sold the property Burdete redeemed the Hirschfield sale
in November of 1975. Hirschfield in December 1875 assigned
his certificate of sale to the Plaintiff.
The California Supreme Court did not even speculate upon
the reasons why Mrs. Burdete may have redeemed.

They only

said:
The successor in interest may redeem, but the judgment debtor may also do so. The statute provides
that the judgment debtor, as such, may redeem * * *
There is no good reason why the statute, which is
remedial in its character, should receive a narrow
construction, in order to defeat the right of
redemption which it intended to give.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9Thi; Court". !..••; not interested in the reasons why the judgment debtor did redeem buL only states:
It might be that the judgment debtor has covenanted with his successor In interest to effect
redemption from the sale, and a variety of other
cases might readily be imagined in which the judgment debtor even though he had sold the property
and would still have an interest in effecting a
redemption from the execution sale.
Chataque

The third case relied upon by the majority opinion,
Couniy

Bank

vc . Ris Ie?/3 19 iV. Y.

3 7 '6 (18 59) ho 1 ds that another

c r e d i t:c> r, "l| * '11< > » ; i s 11 i "> I >'i ]'" a r I: y t: o l h e u n d e r l y i n g i n d e b t e d u e s s ,

could sell the same real estate upon his own execution and the
j'j-anl ee in the sheriff's deed acquired a title superior t:o that
t) f 111 e

i. n d I v 1 d u a I w h o c o n. t e n. d e d 11 "i i1 r c d e in p t: I o n w a s I n e f f e c t i v u ,

In the Chataque

case there was no sliowing of any entitlement of

Liu rudcii,

-

- ,- -

reason t » redeem.

land -v-d :-•'* -v^vipr win* he h;u

L\U> \ , 'J:<Ui JJ

I

- ;-, :

•" •*

relating t^ '• h^ ripht of a deb1 or to Redeem:
Trie right Is secured U. :*iir> ^f- the judgment debtor
by the terms of the statute, notwithstanding he may
have parted with all his interest in the land by a
prior fraudulent or subsequent honest conveyance.
The Chataque

County

Bank

cus.- h i : ; u LM<it tni:* i : v

iliHi u/a« e x e r c i s e d t o j\iv<s ' ' * : i d i w

i w ilai;:;o of

coming i n t o e x i s t e n c e p r i o i

-.•;•..

T h e s e t h r e e c a s e s do n o t ,
(iimi t h r o u g h i.'xhuiim i \ o
h o l d t.h.'il. a m o r t g a g o r

t • ; •
u-d

I redomp-

individuals

:•.. ^ a s e we h i v e b e e n a b l e

-md th^roue.h r e s e a r c h

(or execution d e b t m )

f

to

^ s necn found

to

who hrn: p / j r r e d vni i h
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-10his tit l.c, even though, lie has the right to redeem, takes
title back into his own n.a.';ie as against h'i i? Ijwful sucoessni:
nteres!.
*, !_: i|-' t .-..'

1 .
cesser

i :i .i^U-i. /

.

<-: S p a u l d i n g * i 'i;.,
i

; H ~<*

* irs

> ]. ;\'son was <re ;i- r f^ 4

i \yt\* . . ' i " \ , I : : M ' . \ S ' .

uhio^t proper! y .
' . t \T

.

purchaser

-

f !. "

* " *

'

The redemption oici n, f
f

* "

-

w\ l\ ' «n> f!l a^'son who h e l d a i l

o f 11 t: 1 e wl I i eh S p a u 1 ci i n g c o u 1 ci e ve i a s s e r I:.

5

• * , •..

.L ^-u-tq;age i o r i c i o s u r e s.^U: dt:J t h e n <
^ : ~ *-\ v<r;i
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t

lit;

redemption
incidents

-11"n r\

T

iv

p

THE MAJORITY OPINION ERRS IN ITS HOLDING THAT
SPAULDING RETAINED.SOME TYPE OF INTER EST IN
THE PROPERTY
The majority opinion, 1 n the 7th paragraph of Page 2, seems
t o zre a t e some re s i dua1 p rop e rty in t e r e st in g ran t or s if the y
have mortgaged the property before 1 lai i< i si mp] y becai ise they
retained the bare statutory ri glut to redeem.

The statement says:

There can be no difference in tl le I nterest of one
who loses his land to a judgment creditor on execution and one who voluntarily parts with his
title by deed. It is certainly true that judgment debtors without title to the land sole on
execution have an equitable interest in the land
in that they are entitled to have the land sold
and the proceeds thereof applied to reduce their
indebtedness.
W

respect, f 11 I ! y *" ij. (the C O U U D attention, to iu~le ij v e)(6)

whicl 1 states.
Real Property, Upon the sale of real property the
officer shall give to the purchaser a certificate
of sale containing: (1) a particular description of
of the real property sold; (2) the price paid by
him for each lot or parcel if sold separately;
(3) the whole price paid; (4) a statement to the
effect that all right, title, Interest and claim
of the judgment Hettor in and to the property "is
conveyed to the purchaser; provided that where
such sale is subject to redemption that fact shall
be stated also. * * * [Emphasis added]
On April ID, 1969 Clawson obtained a Certificate of Sale
:

': ci,si.ily giving, In m "lli.'il. Rule 69(e)(6) says:
All right, title, interest and claim of Lliu judgment
deb t or (Sp a n 1 d i n g ) .
On October 16, 1.969, a sheriff's deed was Issued to Clawsott
the maiordty opinion recites and about, which there can be
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

Machine-generated
may contain
n<» dispute . Thatcut o ETOCR,
every
r:ierrors.
}\\\ t wh i eh Spaul d i.ng h;is In

-12We respectfully submit that statutory language cannot be
more inclusive or comprehensive, when dealing with the incidents, interests, or property in or title to the real estate,
than by enumerating "all right, title, interest and claim" to
that property.
The cases cited by the majority opinion hold that the
mortgagor (debtor) may have some reasons why he is entitled
to redeem.

One of those reasons expressed in the majority

opinion's citation to Yoakum

vs.

Bower

on p. 540 (f 51 Cat is:

* * * It might be that the judgment debtor has
covenanted with his successor in interest to
effect a redemption from the sale, and a variety
of other cases might readily be imagined, in
which the judgment debtor, even though he had
sold theproperty, would still have an interest
in effecting a redemption from the execution sale.
It is notable that one of those reasons is not the ability
to reclaim title.
The majority opinion would discriminate between those cases
where the mortgage or judgment debtor had conveyed by warranty
deed and those cases where he had not.

Would the Court give an

individual who had received a quitclaim deed from the judgment
debtor a "conditional11 title that could be defeated by his
grantor redeeming whereas the recipient of a warranty deed
would not be so limited?

Furthermore, how would equity justify

a discrimination between those situations where a redeeming
former owner had voluntarily parted with his title (by warranty

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-13deed or quitclaim deed, assignment or other transfer of
interests) and where he had involuntarily been required to
part with his title because of a lawful, legitimate, honest
debt which he owed, and by levy upon his property to satisfy
it?
Going back to Local

Realty

vs.

not a re-sale or a re-purchase.

Lindquist3

a redemption is

It only voids or annuls the

sale and cancels the certificate.
This is precisely what happened when Spaulding redeemed.
He did not re-purchase the property and certainly McArthur
did not re-sell it to him (85 P2d at

772).

His redemption

voided and annulled the sale and cancelled the certificate
(85 P2d 773).

This left title unencumbered in Clawson.

The Court is faced with the reality of Clawsonfs title obtained at a valid unredeemed sale and a consequent sheriff's
deed.

If that title is taken away from Clawson that divesti-

ture must be accomplished by the expedient of regarding Clawson's title as extinguished by the Certificate

of Sale

to

McArthur when Walker Bank sold under its mortgage foreclosure.
The Court cannot conclude that Clawson1s title was extinguished
by any sheriff's deed because there was none.
If that pretext - extinction of title upon issuance of a
Certificate

of Sale

- is adopted as a judicial rule of mort-

gage foreclosures and execution sales, then there can be no way
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-14to support the right of possession to execution-sold premises during the redemption period in any one other than the
holder of the Certificate of Sale - a result diametrically
contrary in reasoning and result to Local
quist,

96 Utah

2933

85 P2d 770

Realty

vs.

Lind-

(1938).

The dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Crockett sheds
great light on this circumstance where it states:
When Spaulding redeemed, the result was to remove
the Walker Bank mortgage and the judgment of foreclosure, that had been entered against the property * * *
There are sound reasons why the foreclosure or mortgage should exhaust the interest the mortgagee can
claim in the pledged property by reason cf the mortgage. In the first place, the mortgagee has obtained
all the contract calls for with respect to that property * * * when he has received that value * * *
that is all he is entitled to from the security. The
difficulty with the opposite result is that it allows
the mortgagee to have3 in effect

two mortgages on the

-property.

* * *

I cannot see how the effect of that redemption and
wiping out of the mortgage and judgment can properly
be regarded as having the effect either of initiating
a new title in Spaulding or quieting title in him by
removing other prior and valid claims, i.e: the Clawson s.
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-15C O N C L U S I O N
The majority opinion adopts principles which are sound
but, we submit in all respect to the author and those concurring, has moved from those underlying principles to a non
sequitur,

by erecting a fictional title bridge which does

not exist but which has been expressly rejected in the law.
The majority opinion concedes that before the Walker Bank
lien could attach a second time it must find title, or an
interest of some kind, to land in Spaulding.
ding all right3

title3 interest,

and claim,

Title, inclu-

went from Spauld-

ing to Clawson in the sale which was unredeemed.

The majority

opinion proposes to supply the vacuum of title existing in
that circumstance by putting title in McArthur, characterizing Clawson1s title as defunct

by reason of the sale at which

McArthur purchased, and then re-conveying from McArthur to
Spaulding by the latter1s redemption.
The well-established law of this state is that Clawson's
title was not in any sense defunct (Local

Realty

vs.

Lindquist)

and that it persisted because before the redemption period
expired a valid redemption had occurred (Layton
105 Utah l3

140 P2d 759 (1943)

vs.

Layton3

per Justice Ellett, District

Judge, for a unanimous Court).
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-16Clawson was the holder of all right, title, interest,
and claim that Spaulding had ever had when that redemption
took place.
Spaulding1s redemption was not and could not be characterized as a re-sale or a re-purchase (Local
85 P2d at

Realty

vs.

Lindquist,

772).

Clawson, not Spaulding, was entitled to possession.
When the redemption took place, it was lawful because the
statute says it was [69(f)(1) URCP].

The sale was voided and

cancelled upon payment of the "certain sum of money'1
vs.

Layton,

140 P2d

(Layton

759).

Therefore, the circuit of title postulated by the majority,
i.e: Spaulding to Clawson to McArthur to Spaulding to Moesser
was never completed.

The evolution of title stopped at Claw-

son who was the owner of the legal and the equitable title and
entitled to possession at the moment of valid redemption.
We respectfully conclude that the majority opinion establishes an untenable and what in the future will be an exceedingly troublesome precedent.
EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS
We concur with the observations of Mr. Justice Crockett
in his dissenting opinion that it would not be inconsistent with
equity and justice that the Court recognize the superiority of
the claim of the Plaintiffs Clawson but that they should be
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-17required to make reimbursement for the paying off and the
removal of the Walker Bank mortgage lien by Spaulding which
became the burden of Moesser at a sale which could only be
characterized as void.
Inasmuch as the Plaintiffs, as Mr. Justice Crockett
observed, acknowledged their own claim to be inferior to the
bank trust deed which expired by reason of its foreclosure
sale, the Plaintiffs represent that they are willing to make
reimbursement for the paying off and removal of the Walker
Bank lien if the Court believes, in equity and good conscience,
they should do so as a condition to a reversal of the holding
in the majority opinion.
Respectfully submitted
Ken Chamberlain
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN
76 South Main Street
Richfield, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiffs
and Respondents
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